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NOTE
FALSIFICATION AS CONTEMPT
The last twenty years have been witness first to an expansion and
then to a retrenchment of constitutionally protected civil liberties.
The exercise of the contempt power is an area in which constitutional
limitations on modes of procedure are inapplicable so long as the
power is used to preserve the judiciary.'
Contempts are either direct or constructive. Direct contempts are
committed in the presence of the court2 whereas constructive con-
tempts are committed outside the presence of the court.8 This dis-
tinction is significant in that direct contempts are punishable without
a formulated charge, hearing or formal judgment of guilt.4 Construc-
tive contempts are less summarily punishable.5 Both negative and
positive conduct may constitute a contempt of court. Examples of
negative direct contempts are failure to produce a prisoner at a trial
or hearing6 and refusal of a witness to testify. Acts punishable as
positive direct contempts include assaults on judges,8 jurors, attor-
1. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656 (1919).
2. See, e.g., Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 172 N.E. 209, 212,
73 A.L.R. 808 (1930). See DANGEL, CONTEMPT § 7 (1939); 12 Am. JUR., Con-
tempt § 4 (1938).
3. See, e.g., Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755, 760, 31 A.L.R. 1226
(1923); State v. Jones, 111 Ore. 295, 226 Pac. 433, 435, 33 A.L.R. 603 (1924);
Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex. 325, 3 S.W.2d 406, 408, 57 A.L.R. 541 (1928). See
also DANGEL, CONTEMPT § 5 (1939); 12 Am. JUR., Contempt § 4 (1938). A
constructive contempt is synonymous with an indirect contempt. DANGEL,
CoNTmPT § 8 (1939).
4. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 Sup. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767 (1925);
In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405 (1888); United States
v. Landes, 97 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1938); Owens v. Dancy, 36 F.2d 882 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 746 (1929); United States v. Dachis, 36 F.2d 601
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); Mainland v. People, 111 Colo. 198, 139 P.2d 366 (1943);
People v. Berof, 367 Ill. 454, 11 N.E.2d 936 (1937); Harding v. McCullough,
236 Iowa 556, 19 N.E.2d 613 (1945); In re Rotwein, 291 N.Y. 116, 51 N.E.2d
669 (1943); Ex parte Norton, 144 Tex. 445, 191 S.W.2d 713 (1946).
5. Ryals v. United States, 69 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1934); People v. McKinlay,
367 Ill. 504, 11 N.E.2d 933 (1937); Charles Cushman Co. v. Mackesy, 135 Me.
490, 200 At. 505, 118 A.L.R. 148 (1938); Hitzelberger v. State, 173 Md. 435,
196 Atl. 288 (1938); Ex parte Niklaus, 144 Neb. 503, 13 N.W.2d 655 (1944);
Contra: Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 4 So.2d 356 (1941).
6. Ex parte Sternes, 77 Cal. 156, 19 Pac. 275, 11 Am. St. Rep. 251 (1888);
State ex rel. Ewing v. Morris, 120 Wash. 146, 207 Pac. 18 (1922).
7. Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 Pac. 375 (1919); Plunkett v. Hamilton,
136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791 (1931);
In re Kelly, 200 Pac. 430, 50 Atl. 248 (1901).
8. Turquette v. State, 174 Ark. 875, 298 S.W. 15, 55 A.L.R. 1226 (1927);
Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466, 18 A.L.R. 202 (1921); Ex parte
McCown, 139 N.C. 95, 51 S.E. 957 (1905).
9. In re Fountain, 182 N.C. 49, 108 S.E. 342, 18 A.L.R. 208 (1921); cf. In re
Glenn, 103 S.C. 501, 88 S.E. 294 (1916).
272
NoTE
neys, ° witnesses," and officers of the court; 2 interferences with the
trial jury by invitation to the room of defendant's counsel to drink
liquor' 3 or discussion of the case by a litigant in the presence of jurors
who may try it; 14 and perjury or false swearing by a witness in court
or before a grand jury. 5 The problems raised by the positive direct
contempt of perjury or false swearing are the subject of this note.
Perjury is a criminal offense, the elements of which are material,
willful falsity under oath in a judicial proceeding.16 False swearing
is falsification less than perjury in that it need not be material or in
a judicial proceeding.'7 Because of disproportionately harsh sen-
tences and technical rules of proof, convictions for perjury are difficult
to obtain. 8 Two methods of correcting this undesirable situation
have been employed: (1) legislative enactments making false swear-
ing a crime equivalent to second degree perjury;' 9 (2) judicial punish-
ment of perjury and false swearing as contempt2 9 The statutory
method of reform is usually employed. The extension of the summary
contempt power to embrace perjury and false swearing is somewhat
alarming when framed against the injustices which have occurred as
a result of use of the contempt power to punish publications critical
10. United States v. Barrett, 187 Fed. 378 (S.D. Ga. 1911); United States
v. Patterson, 26 Fed. 509 (W.D. Tenn. 1886).
11. Brannon v. Commonwealth, 162 Ky. 350, 172 S.W. 703 (1915); State v.
Little, 175 N.C. 743, 94 S.E. 680 (1917).
12. Ex parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130 (N.D. Ala. 1903); In re Terry, 36 Fed.
419 (D. Cal.), habeas corpus denied, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
13. Poindexter v. State, 109 Ark. 179, 159 S.W. 197 (1913).
14. Baker v. State, 82 Ga. 776, 9 S.E. 743 (1889).
15. See Notes, 73 A.L.R. 817 (1931), 11 A.L.R. 342 (1921).
16. 41 Am. Jim., Perjury § 2 (1942).
17. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3002 (1947); DEL. REV. CODE § 5246 (1935);
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4003 (1935); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432-170 (Baldwin
1943); LA. CODE Cavr. LAW & Psoc. ANN. art. 740-125 (1943); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2:157-4 (1939); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1620-b; UTAH CODE AN. § 76-45-8 (1953);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6000 (1949). These statutory provisions are either en-
titled false swearing or second degree perjury. Other examples of attempts
to make perjury more easily punishable are: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 837.01 (1944)
(false swearing not in a judicial proceeding punishable); MD. AN. CODE
GEN. LAWS art. 27, § 533 (1951) (if a person makes oath to contradictory
statements a conviction for perjury may be had by proving the falsity of one
of the statements); TsNN. CODE AN. § 11073 (Williams 1934) (false swear-
ing not in a judicial proceeding punishable).
18. See King, Perjury in Illinois, 17 ILL. L. REV. 596 (1923); McClintock,
What Happens to Perjurers, 24 AMIN. L. REV. 727, 755 (1940).
19. See 41 Am. Jur., Perjury § 2 (1942).
20. Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.), vacated, 340 U.S.
898 (1950) (cause moot); In re Meckley, 137 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 760 (1943); In re Presentment by Grand Jury of Ellison, 133 F.2d
903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943); Schleier v. United States, 72
F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934); Young v. State, 198
Ind. 629, 154 N.E. 478 (1926); In re Caruba, 140 N.J. Eq. 563, 55 A.2d 289 (Ct.
Err. & App.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 846 (1947); In re D'Amore, 119 N.Y.S.2d
361 (2d Dep't 1952); Tracy Loan and Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102
Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1942).
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of the courts. 1 But perjury or false swearing as contempt has its
own appeal to history.
Perjury as contempt first appeared in bankruptcy cases.2 2 The
limitation of the application of the doctrine to proceedings of this
type23 in the early years of its pronouncement may be traced to two
sources. During the last hal of the nineteenth century a notion
existed in the law courts to the effect that a defendant could deny
the contempt charged against him, and, if the answers completely
cleared him of the offense, they must be taken as true.2 4 The only
way to get at the contemnor was to proceed by information or indict-
ment for perjury. Significantly, however, this notion was not ap-
plicable in equity.25 There the defendant's denial of the contempt
under oath was not conclusive. Thus, in bankruptcy proceedings,
which are equitable in nature, the defendant could not purge himself
of the contempt;26 but in law actions he could. The above theory
adequately explains the limitation of the perjury as contempt doc-
trine to equity cases, but what additional factors were present to
limit it to bankruptcy? In addition to the contempt power embodied
21. See Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of
Powers, 37 ItAlv. L. REV. 1010 (1924); Nelles and King, Contempt by Publica-
tion in the United States, 28 COL. L. REV. 401, 423-31 (1928).
22. See In re Schulman, 177 Fed. 191 (2d Cir. 1910); In re Steiner, 195
Fed. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); In re Fellerman, 149 Fed. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1906);
In re Salkey, 21 Fed. Cas. 235, No. 12, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1875); Ex parte Bradbury,
78 E.C.L. 15 (1853); Ex parte Lord, 16 M. & W. 462, 153 Eng. Rep. 1271 (Ex.
1847); Taylor's Case, 8 Ves. Jr. 328, 32 Eng. Rep. 381 (Ch. 1803); Rex v.
Perrot, 2 Burr. 1122, 97 Eng. Rep. 745 (K.B. 1761).
23. For application of the doctrine in an action by a creditor to compel dis-
covery of his debtor's property, see In re Rosenberg, 90 Wis. 581, 63 N.W.
1056 (1895). In this type proceeding, as in bankruptcy, the debtor will usually
be the only person who can locate the property. The first exception to the
limitation of the exercise of the power to bankruptcy cases appears in New
York in cases where a surety makes a false justification on a judicial bond.
See In re Woods, 134 App. Div. 361, 119 N.Y. Supp. 69 (1st Dep't 1909); In re
Goslin, 95 App. Div. 407, 88 N.Y. Supp. 670 (1st Dep't), affd, 180 N.Y. 505,
72 N.E. 1142 (1904); Buffalo Loan, T. & S. D. Co. v. Medina Gas & E. L. Co.,
68 App. Div. 414, 74 N.Y. Supp. 486 (4th Dep't 1902); In re Sheppard, 33
Misc. 724, 68 N.Y. Supp. 974 (Sup. Ct. 1901); People ex rel. Wise v. Tamsen,
17 Misc. 212, 40 N.Y. Supp. 1047 (Sup. Ct. 1896); In re Hopper, 9 Misc. 171,
29 N.Y. Supp. 715 (N.Y. City Ct. 1894), aff'd, 145 N.Y. 605, 40 N.E. 164 (1895);
Lawrence v. Harrington, 17 N.Y. Supp. 649 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 133 N.Y. 690,
31 N.E. 627 (1892); Simon v. Aldine Publishing Co., 14 Daly 279, 12 N.Y.
Civ. Proc. Rep. 290 (N.Y. City Ct. 1887); Keating v. Goddard, 8 N.Y. Civ.
Proc. Rep. 377 (N.Y. City Ct., 1885); Stephenson v. Hanson, 67 How. Pr.
305, 6 N.Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 43 (N.Y. City Ct., 1884); Eagan v. Lynch, 49 N.Y.
Super. Ct. Rep. 454, 3 N.Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 236 (1883).
24. See In re May, 1 Fed. 737 (E.D. Mich. 1880); Curtis and Curtis, The
Story of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt, 41 HARV. L. REV. 51, 64
(1927). For a twentieth-century version of the application of the notion,
see Appeal of Verdon, 89 N.J.L. 16, 97 Atl. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
25. See 4 BL. COMM. *288; Curtis and Curtis, supra note 24, at 53, 65.
26. In re Fellerman, 149 Fed. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1906). Originally the right to
purge a contempt applied only in constructive contempts on the law side.
See 4 BL. COMM. *286, *287. As the language in the Fellerman case indicates,
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in Section 401 of the Criminal Code27 there was a specific statute
authorizing the punishment of such contempts. 28  This power to
compel a truthful answer was no doubt considered necessary because
questions concerning the disposition of the bankrupt's property are
more likely to be solely within his knowledge. A failure to answer
truthfully on his part would in fact block any further proceedings.
The limitation of the doctrine's applicability to bankruptcy cases
was short lived. It soon began to spread into other areas of litiga-
tion.29 The adoption of the doctrine was made possible on the law
side by rulings of the Supreme Court which first weakened 30 and
then denied the right of a witness to purge himself of contempt.31
No doubt the courts conceived of the power to punish perjury as con-
tempt as a useful means of extracting the truth from a witness. Often
it seems the "truth" extracted was merely the reflection of the court's
views.32 The courts were further tempted to use the summary con-
tempt power to punish perjurers because of the difficulty in obtaining
convictions for perjury.33
The expansion of the perjury as contempt doctrine was temporarily
halted in Ex parte Hudgings3 4 out of fear that "it would come to pass
that a potentiality of oppression and wrong would result and the free-
dom of the citizen when called as a witness in a court would be
gravely imperiled."35 This fear did not persist. The Court of Appeals
this distinction was often ignored in stating the rule of purgation of contempt
under oath.
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1950).
28. 30 STAT. 556 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 69 (1943). This statute provides,
inter alia, that "a person shall not, in proceedings before a referee ... refuse
to be examined according to law...."
29. See, e.g., Ex parte Steiner, 202 Fed. 419 (2d Cir. 1913) (swearing to
false affidavits); In re Ulmer, 208 Fed. 461 (N.D. Ohio 1913) (perjury of trial
witness); Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 161, 133 S.W. 206 (1911) (trial
witness admittedly testified falsely); Edwards v. Edwards, 87 N.J. Eq. 546,
100 Atl. 608 (Ch. 1917) (perjury committed by petitioner who induced court
to grant divorce decree); Seastream v. N. J. Exhibition Co., 61 Atl. 1041 (N.J.
Ch. 1905) (contradictory affidavits).
30. See Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 699, 33 L. Ed. 150 (1889).
31. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 Sup. Ct. 165, 51 L. Ed. 319, 8
Ann. Cas. 265 (1906).
32. This theory was first pronounced in State v. Lazarus, 37 La. Ann. 314
(1885). See also Er parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 384, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63
L. Ed. 656 (1919); State v. Meese, 200 Wis. 454, 225 N.W. 746 (1929), 229 N.W.
31, 33 (1930).
33. See King, Perjury in Illinois, 17 ILL. L. REV. 596 (1923); McClintock,
What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Mnm. L. REv. 727, 755 (1940).
34. 249 U.S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656 (1919). For a note criticizing
the case see, 19 COL. L. REv. 335 (1919). The restriction of the summary
contempt power to punish perjury was announced by Chief Justice White.
It is interesting to note that only a year earlier in Toledo Newsnaper Co. v.
United States, 247 U.S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186 (1918), Chief Justice
White allowed an extension of the use of the summary contempt power in
dealing with newspapers.
35. Er parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 384, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656
(1919).
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for the Sixth Circuit picked up where it had left off in a bankruptcy
case,3 6 and the second circuit, in a series of cases, proceeded to extend
the application of the doctrine by holding that a witness who testified
falsely before the grand jury was guilty of contempt of the district
court.3 7 The argument in these cases, that the allegedly false testi-
mony before the grand jury did not fall under the statutory summary
contempt power in that it was not committed in the presence of the
court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,
was unavailing. In dismissing this argument one case referred to
Ex parte Savin38 which held that witnesses before a grand jury are
within the court's presence, but said it was unnecessary to decide this
point because there was no doubt that they fall either under that class
or the "so near as to obstruct" class.39
The state courts did not hesitate to follow the trend of extension
established by the federal courts,40 but the most easily traceable line
of development remained in the federal courts. By 1945 the third and
seventh circuits had seen fit to follow the second circuit's lead in
summarily committing witnesses who testified falsely in grand jury
proceedings,4' and the Supreme Court similarly treated a juror who
on voir dire had concealed her previous employment by the defendant
and had caused a mis-trial by unreasonably refusing to vote for con-
viction.4 2 Even if the correctness of these decisions as judged by the
tests pronounced in the early bankruptcy cases is conceded, it is
evident that the application of the doctrine had undergone a mush-
room-like growth. The opinion by Mr. Justice Black in In re Michae1
48
in 1945 seriously stunted this growth. The Court reiterated the prin-
36. Haimsohn v. United States, 2 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1924).
37. Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926) (although dis-
allowing the particular use of the contempt power, case indicated that under
certain circumstances witnesses before a grand jury may be held in contempt
for false swearing); O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Manton, J., dissenting); Lang v. United States, 55 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1932);
United States v. McGovern, 60 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 650
(1932); Schleier v. United States, 72 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.) (Manton J, dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934). The second circuit in The Reno, 61
F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1932), did not extend the doctrine to trial witnesses giving
contradictory testimony.
38. 131 U.S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 699, 33 L. Ed. 150 (1889).
39. O'Connell v. United States, 40 F.2d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 1930).
40. See, e.g., Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 172 N.E. 209,
73 A.L.R. 808 (1930) (probate proceedings); People v. Doe, 226 Mich. 5, 196
N.W. 757 (1924) (grand jury); Backer v. A. B. & B. Realty Co., 107 N.J. Eq.
246, 152 Atl. 241 (Ch. 1930) (affidavits); In re Nunns, 188 App. Div. 424, 176
N.Y. Supp. 858 (2d Dep't 1919) (voir dire).
41. In re Meckley, 137 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 760 (1943);
In re Presentment by Grand Jury of Ellison, 133 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943); Blim v. United States, 68 F.2d 484 (7th Cir.
1934). The trend of extension was not without its setbacks. See United States
v. Arbuckle, 48 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1943).
42. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 Sup. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed. 993 (1932).
43. 326 U.S. 224, 66 Sup. Ct. 78, 90 L. Ed. 30 (1945).
[VrOL. 7
NOTE
ciples announced in Ex parte Hudgings44 and showed concern lest the
contempt power be used to punish perjurers. Such action- would
constitute a denial of trial by jury, a particularly undesirable occur-
rence in these circumstances because the judge would don the garb
of both prosecutor and trier of fact. There is evidence that the prin-
ciples of this case will be heeded,45 but it is not to be assumed that
the death knell of perjury as contempt has been tolled. 46 The use
of the power is appealingly convenient in handling recalcitrant wit-
nesses. It is an historical fact that the scope of the applicability of
the doctrine has been considerably widened since its inception in
bankruptcy cases. Thus it becomes important to take note of those
factors which should be considered by a court today in deciding
whether or not allegedly false testimony constitutes a contempt of
court.
Hegelaw v. State47 contains a concise statement of the elements
which must subsist to justify a finding that falsification also consti-
tutes a contempt. These elements are: "(1) That the alleged false
answer had an obstructive effect. (2) Judicial knowledge of the
falsity of the testimony. (3) The question must be pertinent to the
issues."
(1) That the allegedly false answer obstructed the administration
of justice. The courts' summary contempt power is based on the
necessity of self-preservation. 48 In the cases this principle is expressed
by saying the court may summarily prevent an obstruction to the
administration of justice 9 From a common sense viewpoint there
are three ways in which a false answer can obstruct the administra-
44. 249 U.S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656 (1919).
45. See United States ex. rel. Johnson v. Goldstein, 158 F.2d 916 (7th Cir.
1947). There is also a line of state cases which restricts the use of the sum-
mary contempt power but the basis of those holdings is more that the court
did not have judicial knowledge of the falsity than the absence of an obstruc-
tion to the administration of justice. See Ex parte Blache, 40 Cal. App.2d
687, 105 P.2d 635 (1940); Mitchell v. Parrish, 58 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1952); State
ex. rel. Luban v. Coleman, 138 Fla. 555, 189 So. 713 (1939); People ex rel.
Butwill v. Butwill, 312 IM. App. 218, 38 N.E.2d 377 (1941); People v. Tomlinson,
296 Ill. App. 609, 16 N.E.2d 940 (1938); People v. La Scola, 282 Ill. App. 328
(1936); Wilder v. Sampson, 279 Ky. 103, 129 S.W.2d 1022 (1939); State v.
llario, 10 N.J. Super. 475, 77 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1950); Fawick Airflex Co.
v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N.E.2d 436, app.
dismissed, 93 N.E.2d 409 (1950). See Note, 27 J. Cnmv.. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 452
(1936).
46. Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908 "(8th Cir.), vacated, 340 U.S. 898
(1950) (cause moot). The eighth circuit opinion tended to minimize the
policy reasons for restricting summary punishment.
47. 24 Ohio App. 103, 155 N.E. 620, 621 (1927).
48. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 37 Sup. Ct. 448, 61 L. Ed. 881 (1917).
See 4 BL. CoM. *486; Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 21, at 1022; Nelles,
The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL. L. REV. 956, 959 (1931).
49. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 66 Sup. Ct. 78, 90 L. Ed. 30 (1945); Ex parte
Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656 (1919); Nelles, supra
note 48; Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 21.
1954]
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tion of justice. First, it may mislead the court and thereby frustrate
the purpose of the trial, that is, a decision based on truth. Or it may
cause the consumption of time and energy in an attempt to show its
falsity. Last, it may block the inquiry. However sensible these views
may appear at first blush, the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that false answers have an obstructive effect only when
they block the inquiry.50 Is the Court, like Humpty-Dumpty, saying
these words mean what we say they mean, regardless of normal under-
standing? Possibly yes, but not without reason. This is an area in
which the procedural safeguards of the Constitution are normally
inapplicable. 51 Thus the Court has felt that it must be responsive
to any abuse. The avenue chosen seems to be a restrictive interpre-
tation of an obstruction to the administration of justice. The theory
is that there is a distinction between an obstruction of justice and
an obstruction to the administration of justice.5 2 The domain of the
former is substantive and of the latter mechanical. The Supreme
Court indicates that since self-preservation, the principal justification
of the summary contempt power, demands only the mechanical func-
tioning of the court, the exercise of the power should be limited to
those cases wherein that functioning is impeded.53 Yet is it not funda-
mental that an institution which consistently fails to perform its
substantive function will be destroyed? Thus the principal justifica-
tion of the summary contempt power, self-preservation, demands more
than mere mechanical functioning. Substance rather than form is
critical. An accurate construction would encompass perjuries which
would thwart the dispensation of justice. This is not to say that the
decisions arrived at by applying the "blocking of the inquiry" test
were unjust. The point is that the decisions are based on a tortured
construction of an obstruction to the administration of justice and are,
therefore, vulnerable to attack.
Since obstruction to the administration of justice is not an adequate
standard by which to judge whether perjury constitutes a contempt,
what alternative standard is available?
(2) Judicial knowledge of the falsity of the testimony. The federal
courts generally rely upon obstruction to the administration of justice
as a limitation on the summary contempt power. 4 The tendency
50. Cases cited note 49 supra. See Note, 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 284 (1945).
51. See Ex parte Hudgings, supra note 49, at 383. But see In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948).
52. Rosner v. United States, 10 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1926). See Nelles, supra
note 48, at 960. But see Note, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 582, 587 (1933).
53. United States v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). The Supreme
Court, in Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656
(1919) seems to adopt the reasoning of the Appel case.
54. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Johnson v. Goldstein, 158 F.2d 916
(7th Cir. 1947); The Reno, 61 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Ar-
[ VOL. 7
NOTE
of the state cases is to submerge discussion of that element and rely
on the requirement that the falsity be within the judicial knowledge
of the court.55 No doubt one reason for this tendency is the difficulty
encountered in applying the obstruction test.5 Another is that the
judicial knowledge test is a short-hand expression of the courts' policy
not to deny an alleged offender a jury trial if there is an issue as
to the falsity of his testimony. Use of judicial knowledge as a test
invades the province of the jury very little and yet leaves the court
power to deal with patent falsification. The deterrent effect of the
summary contempt power on persistent and flagrant perjury is left
intact. In this capacity it will be particularly useful in those state
courts where the judge is not allowed to comment on the evidence.
The possibility that the jury will be mislead by perjured testimony
is combatted.
As a practical matter judicial knowledge of falsification has been
held to be acquired by an admission of the testifying party,57 by the
introduction of affidavits by a party which set up conflicting sets of
facts,58 or by uncontrovertible documentary evidence.59 Of course
lack of judicial knowledge prohibits summary commitment. 0 There
is a definite indication that the Supreme Court has recognized the
efficacy of this test;6' however, recent decisions of the courts of appeals
give small hope that it will be adopted.
62
(3) That the falsification be material. This requirement is actually
buckle, 48 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1943). See also 18 So. CALiF. L. REV. 284
(1945).
55. Ex parte Blache, 40 Cal. App.2d 687, 105 P.2d 635 (1940); Mitchell v.
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222 S.W. 1085, 11 A.L.R. 337 (1920); State v. Illario, 10 N.J. Super. 475, 77
A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1950); Edwards v. Edwards, 87 N.J. Eq. 546, 100 Atl.
608 (Ch. 1917); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87
Ohio App. 371, 92 N.E.2d 436, app. dismissed, 93 N.E.2d 409 (1950); State v.
Meese, 200 Wis. 454, 225 N.W. 746 (1929).
56. The source of this difficulty lies in the notion that the theoretical basis
of contempt power, self-preservation, demands only the mechanical function-
ing of the court. However, that there is a "penumbra as well as a distinction
between justice and its administration" is recognized by at least one com-
mentator. See Nelles, supra note 48, at 960.
57. People v. Freeman, 256 Ill. App. 233 (1930); In re Caruba, 140 N.J. Eq.
563, 55 A.2d 289 (Ch. 1947).
58. Ex parte Steiner, 202 Fed. 419 (2d Cir. 1913); Sachs v. High Clothing
Co., 90 N.J. Eq. 545, 108 Atl. 58 (Ch. 1919).
59. Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 172 N.E. 209, 73 A.L.R.
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an element of perjury; therefore, discussion of it in this paper will
be brief. Although materiality is generally said to be necessary for
falsification to be contempt, 8 there is authority to the effect that any
falsification which has an obstructive tendency may be contempt
though not perjury because immaterial. 4 An immaterial falsification
is held to be a contempt on the theory that it is an affront to the
dignity of the court.65 This theory should have disappeared with
that of the divine right of kings. Today the basis of the contempt
power is preservation of the court system.00 Since falsifications on
immaterial matters do not threaten the existence of the courts, they
should not be punished as contempts. Thus the materiality of the
falsification should be set forth before the summary contempt com-
mitment will be held valid.
CONCLUSION
The problem in falsification as contempt lies in striking a balance
between two conflicting policies: (1) that of not encroaching on an
individual's constitutional right to a jury trial, and (2) that of pres-
ervation of the judiciary by use of the summary contempt power as
a deterrent to falsification. These conflicting policies must be weighed
against the background of repeated extension of the summary con-
tempt power into virgin areas of litigation and the concomitant re-
striction of the right to a trial by jury. Weigh these policies, but
weigh them with a judicious concern for the individual liberties
embodied in the fifth and sixth Amendments. It is believed that
these requirements measure up to this standard: in order to sum-
marily commit a false swearer for contempt a court should find that
the statement was material to the trial or investigation and that the
falsity of the statement was within its judicial knowledge.
STEPHEN D. POTTS.
63. Gold Sign Co. v. Cosmas, 124 Misc. 877, 209 N.Y. Supp. 611 (Sup. Ct.
(1925) ; Hegelaw v. State, 24 Ohio App. 103, 155 N.E. 620 (1927).
64. Young v. State, 198 Ind. 629, 154 N.E. 478 (1926).
65. Young v. State, 198 Ind. 629, 154 N.E. 478, 479 (1926). See Note, 21
CALw. L. REv. 582, 588 n.29 (1933).
66. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103, 44 Sup. Ct. 272, 68 L. Ed. 577
(1924); United States v. Karns, 27 F.2d 453 (N.D. Okla. 1928); Nelles, supra
note 48, at 959.
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